Harsanyi invested his Aggregation Theorem and Impartial Observer Theorem with deep utilitarian sense, but Sen redescribed them as "representation theorems" with little ethical import. This negative view has gained wide acquiescence in economics. Against it, we support the utilitarian interpretation by a novel argument relative to the Aggregation Theorem. We suppose that a utilitarian observer evaluates non-risky alternatives by the sum of individual utilities and investigate his von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) preference on risky alternatives. Adding some technical assumptions to Harsanyi's, we conclude that (i) this observer would use the utility sum as a VNM utility function, and crucially, (ii) any social observer would evaluate both risky and non-risky alternatives in terms of a weighted utility sum.
Introduction
First acclaimed as pathbreaking contributions to social ethics, Harsanyi's Impartial Observer and Aggregation Theorems (1953, 1955) were later criticized by Sen (1977 Sen ( , 1986 for being hardly relevant to the …eld. Using ethically loaded postulates, such as the socalled Acceptance principle (in the …rst theorem) or the standard Pareto principle (in the second theorem), along with a von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) apparatus of expected utility for both the individuals and the social observer (in either theorem), Harsanyi shows that the observer's VNM utility function equals a weighted sum of individual VNM utility functions, and then claims to have grounded utilitarianism in a new way. Not questioning the formal validity of the theorems, Sen objects against their interpretation. For him, Harsanyi's …rst theorem is "about utilitarianism in a rather limited sense", and his second theorem, while more informative, remains "primarily a representation theorem" (1986, p. 1123-4) . To summarize bluntly, he discards the …rst theorem and salvages only the mathematical achievement in the second; neither has to do with utilitarianism properly (see also Sen, 1974 and ).
Sen's critique has gained wide acquiescence among economists, especially after Weymark (1991) ampli…ed it in a thorough discussion of the "Harsanyi-Sen debate". Those, like Mongin and d'Aspremont (1998) , who maintained that the critique can be addressed, barely had a hearing, and today's prevailing view seems to be that Harsanyi's attempt at deriving utilitarianism from VNM assumptions is simply hopeless.
Running against the tide, we o¤er a novel argument in favour of Harsanyi's position.
We regard it as being severely incomplete, but not ‡awed, and undertake to buttress it, somewhat paradoxically, by a further in ‡ux of "representation theorems". Those proved below complement Harsanyi's Aggregation Theorem and provide it, or so we claim, with a utilitarian interpretation that it does not have by itself. Like Harsanyi, we suppose that the individuals'preferences satisfy the VNM axioms on risky alternatives. Unlike him, we start from a social observer who has already formed social preferences on sure alternatives according to the sum rule of classical utilitarianism, and we suppose that his preferences can be extended to lotteries so as to satisfy the VNM axioms. Under relevant technical assumptions from microeconomics, we obtain two consequences in a row. First, if the extended preferences satisfy the Pareto principle, they are represented as the expected utility of the classical utilitarian sum, i.e., this sum is also the utilitarian observer's VNM utility function (up to a positive a¢ ne transformation).
Second -a result holding this time for any social observer -preferences on lotteries that are VNM and Paretian are represented as the expected utility of a weighted variant of the utilitarian sum, i.e., the variant in question is also the social observer's VNM utility function (up to a positive a¢ ne transformation). Accordingly, it is also the social rule employed to evaluate the sure alternatives.
The second statement conveys the …nal message: utilitarianism prevails inasmuch as the social observer must add up the same cardinal individual utility functions as our supposed utilitarian; however, it fails to the extent that the weights in the sum may not be equal. This is not classical utilitarianism all the way down, but still a good deal of it (social choice theorists, e.g., d 'Aspremont and Gevers, 2002 , call it weighted utilitarianism).
In sum, there is a sense in which Harsanyi was correct in believing that VNM theory could help support utilitarianism. He did not carry the argument to its end, and Sen was thus justi…ed in questioning it, but the challenge is not unanswerable despite the common presumption.
In section 2, we develop Sen's objections in some formal detail. We do not review the whole controversy with Harsanyi, since part of it is self-explanatory or well covered elsewhere. In particular, we do not discuss the normative plausibility of utilitarianism and its problematic stand towards income inequality, which have raised lively discussions among both economists and philosophers. Instead, we concentrate on the single issue of whether the Aggregation Theorem is at all relevant to utilitarianism. Section 3 sets up the formal framework with its technical assumptions. They amount to replacing Harsanyi's abstract social states by allocations of commodities between the individuals, and then imposing constraints on these more structured objects as well as their individual and social evaluations. Section 4 states three theorems that derive utilitarianism from Paretian aggregation; each follows from speci…c assumptions made on the allocations, preferences and utilities. The appendix explains the mathematical tools.
2 Just "representations theorems"?
Sen objects as follows against the use of VNM utility functions for utilitarian purposes: "The (VNM) values are of obvious importance for protecting individual or social choice under uncertainty, but there is no obligation to talk about (VNM) values only whenever one is talking about individual welfare" (1977, p. 277) . This is but an expression of doubt, but later Sen argues more strongly: "(Harsanyi's theorem) does not yield utilitarianism as such -only linearity... I feel sad that Harsanyi should continue to believe that his contribution lay in providing an axiomatic justi…cation of utilitarianism with real content." (1977, p. 300 ).
Here it is again with some detail (this comment was intended for the Impartial Observer Theorem, but if it applies there, it also does here): "This is a theorem about utilitarianism in a rather limited sense in that the VNM cardinal scaling of utilities covers both (the social and individual utilities) within one integrated system of numbering, and the individual utility numbers do not have independent meaning other than the value associated with each "prize", in predicting choices over lotteries.
There is no independent concept of individual utilities of which social welfare is shown to be the sum, and as such the results asserts a good deal less than classical utilitarianism does" (1986, p. 1123).
A major claim can be read between these lines: VNM theory provides a cardinalization of utility, both individual and social, which is relevant to preference under uncertainty, but prima facie useless for the evaluation of welfare, which is the utilitarian's genuine concern. Of course, the sum rule of classical utilitarianism presupposes that individual utility functions are cardinally comparable, but there is no reason to conclude that these functions belong to the class of cardinal functions that VNM theory makes available on a completely separate axiomatic basis.
There is another claim in the passage, but it is more subdued. Weymark brings it out clearly: "No signi…cance should be attached to the linearity or non-linearity of the social welfare function, as the curvature of this function depends solely on whether or not VNM representations are used, and the use of such representations is arbitrary" (1991, p. 315) .
That is to say, VNM theory deals with preferences taken in an ordinal sense, and it is only for convenience that one usually represents them by means of an expected utility.
It is theoretically permissible to replace the individual's VNM utility functions by any non-a¢ ne increasing transform, and if one would do so, the social observer's function would not be linear anymore, but only additively separable, in terms of individual utility numbers. That is, it would read as v = '(
where v, v i are the chosen increasing transforms of the social and individual VNM utility functions, respectively, and ', ' i are the corresponding transformation mappings. This line of criticism also leads to the conclusion that Harsanyi proved no more than representation theorems (see Weymark, 1991, p. 305) . Some de…nitions and notation, which anticipate on the framework of next section, will help make the two objections formally. If & is a preference relation on a set S and w a real-valued function on S, we say, as usual, that w represents % on S, or that V is a utility function for % on S, i¤ for all x; y 2 S,
We are in particular concerned with preference relations on a lottery set L. There is an underlying outcome set X, and by the familiar identi…cation of outcomes with sure lotteries, X L. If a preference % on L satis…es the VNM axioms, the VNM representation theorem guarantees that there exists a utility function u for % on X with the property that the expectation Eu is a utility function for % on L. Both u and Eu will be called VNM utility functions, a standard practice.
The VNM representation theorem also teaches that the set of those u 0 for which Eu 0 is a utility function for % on L is exactly the set of positive a¢ ne transforms (PAT) of the given u, i.e., the set of all u + with > 0 and 2 R. Clearly,
By the same token, the set of utility functions for % on L that take the form Eu 0 is
In all existing versions (see Fishburn's 1982 review) , the VNM axioms de…ne an ordinal preference concept, and thus do not by themselves justify selecting a representation in U 0 rather than F 0 . This is the point well emphasized by Weymark.
We are also concerned with the social rule of a utilitarian observer, and we de…ne it as follows. In the observer's eyes, the individuals i = 1; :::; n are associated with welfare indexes u i on the outcome set X that meaningfully add up, i.e., the u i must be both cardinally measurable and comparable. Accordingly, this social rule may be any element of the set:
) .
(For a related treatment of utilitarianism in social choice theory, see d 'Aspremont and Gevers, 2002.) With the de…nitions just made, it is impossible to conclude that u i 2 U i , the set of that u i is a utility function for % i on X, for this does not deliver cardinal equivalence with u i ; that is, one gets u i 2 F i , the set of i's representations on X at large, and not u i 2 U i , as utilitarianism would require; and similarly, the assumption does not make P i u i a member of the set C.
To take stock, two problems stand in the way of Harsanyi's utilitarian interpretation of his results. One -call it Sen's point -is that VNM theory has a cardinalization of its own; the other -call it Weymark's point -is that this cardinalization is arti…cial given the ordinal nature of that theory. There is a convenient joint answer, which is to ground the utility functions u i and u i on a common basis of cardinal preference. If the utilitarian cardinalization rests on a preference basis and the VNM cardinalization can be reduced to that basis, the two coincide (pace Sen) and the former escape irrelevance (pace Weymark).
Technically, a cardinal preference is a relation on pairs of sure alternatives, i.e., (x; y) % i (z; w), and the axioms for % embody the utilitarian tenet that coherent comparisons can be made of intraindividual preference di¤erences. There will be a connecting axiom to ensure that the VNM cardinalization is rooted in the same comparisons. It will entail the consequence that for all x; y; w; z 2 X,
Mongin (2002) develops this strategy, which was already suggested, but without axiomatic detail, in Weymark (1991, p. 308) and Mongin and d'Aspremont (1998, p. 435) .
It is helpful in making Harsanyi's position logically consistent, but it is question-begging, because the axioms are only a roundabout way of getting the problematic equivalence ( ). Moreover, for most economists, preference is an ordinal concept by de…nition, and it may even be so for Harsanyi himself. In this paper, we dispense with ( ) or its axiomatic counterpart in terms of cardinal preference, and we use an indirect argument instead. It will be seen that it takes care of the two critical points at the same time.
The framework and assumptions
We assume that there is a feasible set X, the elements of which are allocations of commodities to the n 2 individuals. As a typical application, X R mn , where m is the number of commodities. Unlike basic consumer theory, which takes X = R mn + , we do not require X to be a Cartesian product, and indeed, this structure becomes ill-suited when the list of commodities includes public goods or services exchanged between individuals, so that individual consumptions exhibit technical dependencies. Even in the standard case of private goods, it may be an inappropriate structure if X takes the availability of resources into account. We require connectedness, a weakening of the convexity assumption that the basic theory often makes. We can a¤ord to be general in another direction by allowing X to be a subset of a function space, and not simply of the Euclidean space.
All that matters is the following domain assumption.
Assumption 1: X is a metric connected space.
The VNM apparatus can now be introduced formally. When we apply it to the social observer, all standard construals of VNM theory in expectational form work; take any one of the axiomatizations in Fishburn (1982) . However, concerning the individuals, we need continuous VNM utility functions, a property which the usual systems do not provide, so we turn to Grandmont's (1972) version, which is set up for that purpose.
De…ne B(X) to be the set of Borelian sets of X, i.e., the -algebra generated by the open sets, and take the set (X) of all probability measures on the measurable space (X; B(X)). By a standard assumption, this set is endowed with the topology of weak convergence, which makes it a metric space in its own right. Now, a continuous VNM preference relation % on (X) is by de…nition an ordering that satis…es two conditions (as usual, we write p q and p q for the symmetric and asymmetric parts of %):
(Continuity) For all p 2 (X), the sets
(Independence) For all p; q; r 2 (X) and all Grandmont's Theorem 3 (1972, p. 49) ensures that there is a continuous and bounded utility function u(x) for % on X such that the expectation v(p) = Eu(p) is a utility function for % on (X). It is also the case that v is continuous, and that the set of u 0 such that % is represented by Eu 0 is exactly the set of PAT of u.
We retain Grandmont's de…nition of the lottery set, letting L = (X); and apply his preference apparatus to the individuals.
Assumption 2: Each i = 1; :::; n is endowed with a continuous VNM preference
By contrast, the utilitarian half of the construction relies on primitives directly expressed in terms of utility functions. We …x a vector of functions on X, U = (u 1 ; :::; u n ),
to represent the cardinally measurable and comparable utility functions that a utilitarian social observer would associate with the individuals, and accordingly, we formally de…ne the classical utilitarian social preference ordering % on X by
We need technical conditions on U .
Assumption 3: For each i = 1; :::; n, u i is continuous on X.
Assumption 4: The image set U (X) has nonempty connected interior U (X) in R n and is such that U (X) U (X) , i.e., is included in the closure of its interior.
It would be equivalent to impose these assumptions on any collection of PAT ' i u i (with the same for all i), so that they make good utilitarian sense. Assumption 3 is mild and standard, but Assumption 4 is less so. In one respect, it simply complements Assumptions 1 and 3, which entail that U (X) is connected, by excluding unusual ways in which connectedness applies to this set. In another respect, it requires U (X) to have full dimension n, hence u 1 ; :::; u n to be linearly independent functions. This is not demanding under standard microeconomic conditions. If there are private consumption goods, each individual is concerned only with how much of these goods he consumes, and free disposal is allowed, then throwing away some of the individual's allocation will change his utility without a¤ecting the others'. However, if there are only pure public goods, Assumption 4 requires su¢ cient diversity of individual preferences (for instance, no two individuals can be alike in the utilitarian observer's eyes).
In a variant of our analysis, we shift the dimensionality requirement from the util-itarian to the VNM side. This variant requires the continuity of Eu i instead of u i and dispenses with connectedness assumptions. Accordingly, 1, 3 and 4 are modi…ed thus.
Assumption 1' : X is a metric space.
Assumption 3' : For each i = 1; :::; n, Eu i is continuous on L.
Assumption 4' : For each i = 1; :::; n, there are
The last property is sometimes called Independent Prospects (IP) in the literature, and it is provably equivalent to the following: for any vector V = (v 1 ; :::; v n ) of VNM utility functions for % 1 ; :::; % n on L, the v i are a¢ nely independent. (That IP entails linear, hence a¢ ne independence, is obvious and not limited to VNM functions; however, the converse is non-trivial and speci…c to such functions.)
Finally, we relate the utilitarian and VNM halves of the construction to each other.
Assumption 5: For each i = 1; :::; n, u i is a utility function for % i on X.
Crucially, this imposes no more than ordinal equivalence on u i and u i , whereas cardinal equivalence may not hold between them; if we assumed the latter right away, we would in essence fall back on the equivalence ( ) of last section and the strategy that was criticized as being question-begging.
That u i and u i are ordinally equivalent means that u i = f i u i for some increasing function f i on u i (X). Actually, more can be said on f i in view of the previous assumptions.
Lemma 1 Suppose that g and h are continuous real-valued functions de…ned on a pathconnected set X and f is a real-valued function de…ned on g(X) such that h = f g; then,
f is also continuous. It follows from Assumptions 1-3 that f i is continuous for i = 1; :::; n:
To complete the mathematical groundwork for the next section, we state a functional equation theorem that drives its mathematical analysis. Rado and Baker (1987) proved it for k = 2, but it generalizes to k 2. Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1999) assumed this more general form to derive Harsanyi's Aggregation Theorem on a domain of state-contingent alternatives.
Take Z and E to be normed vector spaces, and T to be an open connected subset of
z i j (z 1 ; :::; z k ) 2 S ) and S i = proj i S,
i.e., the projection of S on the i-th factor of Z k .
Lemma 2 Suppose that f : T + ! E and f i : T i ! E, i = 1; :::; k satisfy the equation
for all (z 1 ; :::; z k ) 2 T . Suppose that one of the f , f i is continuous. Then, there exist a linear function A : Z ! E and scalars b 1 ,...,b k such that the functions on Z de…ned by
extend f and f i , i = 1; :::; k, respectively, and such that
holds for all (z 1 ; :::; z k ) 2 Z k . There are no other functions than F and the F i just de…ned that extend f and the f i while satisfying this equation.
Theorems on utilitarianism from Paretian aggregation
The Aggregation Theorem was …rst stated by Harsanyi (1955 Harsanyi ( , 1977 and rigorously proved and developed by later authors. The lottery set L and the VNM axioms in its statement can be taken in all the ways covered by Fishburn (1982) . The theorem relies on a Pareto condition that can also be formulated variously, and this needs spelling out. Given individual preference relations % i , i = 1; :::; n, and a social preference relation %, all being de…ned on L, let us say that Pareto indi¤erence holds if, for all p; q 2 L, p i q; i = 1; :::; n ) p q, and that Strong Pareto holds if, in addition to Pareto indi¤erence, for all p; q 2 L, p % i q; i = 1; :::; n & 9i :
The Aggregation Theorem is often stated in terms of Pareto indi¤erence alone, but we adopt here a more assertive form based on Strong Pareto. Along with further Paretian variants, it is proved in Weymark (1993) and De Meyer and Mongin (1995) .
Lemma 3 (The Aggregation Theorem) Suppose that there are individual preference relations % 1 ; :::; % n and a social preference relation % satisfying the VNM axioms on a lottery set L, and suppose also that Pareto indi¤erence holds. Then, for every choice of VNM utility functions v; v 1 ; :::; v n for %; % 1 ; :::; % n on L, there are real numbers a 1 ; :::; a n and b such that
If Strong Pareto holds, there exist a i > 0, i = 1; :::; n. The a i and b are unique if and only if the v 1 ; :::; v n are a¢ nely independent. Now to our results. In each of them, we suppose that the utilitarian social preference % on X can be extended to a VNM preference % ext on L, which calls for a technical comment. By de…nition, for all x; y 2 X,
Clearly, the following preference % satis…es the requisites: for all p; q 2 L,
But clearly also, there are other VNM extensions % ext of % to L. They involve cardinalizations di¤erent from the utilitarian one -another occurrence of Sen's point in section 2. The force of our theorem is precisely to exclude these other extensions, using Paretian assumptions as further constraints on % ext . Once uniqueness of % ext is secured, much more follows, in particular a strong claim concerning any arbitrary social observer.
Theorem 1 Let assumptions 1-5 hold. Consider an extension % ext to L of the utilitarian % on X that satis…es the VNM axioms, and suppose that Pareto indi¤erence holds between % ext and the % i . Then, the set of VNM utility functions for % ext on X is the set of PAT of P n i=1 u i . Furthermore, for any preference relation % on L satisfying the VNM axioms, if Pareto indi¤erence holds between % and the % i , there are unique constants a i ; i = 1; :::; n, such that the set of VNM utility functions for % on X is the set of PAT of P i a i u i . If % satis…es the Strong Pareto condition, the a i are positive.
Proof. Let Eu i and Eu be VNM utility functions for % i and % ext , respectively, on the lottery set on L. By Lemma 3 applied to these functions, there are constants b i , i = 1; :::; n and d s.t.
There are increasing functions f i on u i (X) and f on P n i=1 u i (X) s.t. u i = f i u i and u = f P n i=1 u i , and when restricted to X, the equation becomes:
The increasing property of f makes u increasing in each u i , and therefore in each u i , as f 1 i is increasing, which leads to b i > 0, i = 1; :::; n. Also, by Lemma 1, each f i is continuous, and so is f because u = P i=1 b i u i + d and
for all (z 1 ; :::; z n ) 2 U (X) R n .
Consider the subset T = U (X) . It is a nonempty, open connected subset of R n , and one of the f; f 0 i is continuous (all are), so we can apply Lemma 2 to the functional equation by restricting it to T . It follows that there exist constants A > 0 and c 1 ,...,c n s.t.
(
where T + , T i are de…ned like S + , S i before Lemma 2.
A stronger result actually holds:
:::; n:
There is (z 1 ; :::; z n ) 2 U (X) s.t. z = P n i=1 z i . As (z 1 ; :::; z n ) 2 T by assumption, there is in T a sequence (z 
which establishes (1 0 ). The proof of (2 0 ) from (2) is similar. Equation (1 0 ) and the initial de…nition of f entail that, for all x 2 X,
i.e., u is a PAT of P i u i . Similarly, for i = 1; :::; n, equations (2 0 ) and the de…nitions of f 0 i and f i entail that for all x 2 X,
It follows that the sets of VNM utility functions for % ext and % i on X are the sets of PAT of P n i=1 u i and u i , respectively. Now, take % as speci…ed and …x a VNM utility function Eu 0 for % on L. Lemma 3 can be applied to Eu 0 , and for each i, some choice of VNM utility function for % i on L. But the last paragraph has shown that this utility function must be a PAT of Eu i . It follows that there are real numbers a i ; i = 1; :::; n, and b s.t.
is a VNM utility function for % on X. Thus, the set of VNM utility functions for % on X is the set of PAT of P n i=1 a i u i . The a i are unique because the u i are a¢ nely independent by assumption. If % satis…es the Strong Pareto condition, Lemma 3 entails that the a i are positive.
We now provide a variant of the previous result that shifts the dimensionality requirement from the utilitarian vector U = (u 1 ; :::; u n ) to the vector of VNM representations V = (v 1 ; :::; v n ) of % 1 ; :::; % n . This is perhaps not so intuitive, but the technical advantage is that the connectedness assumptions can be dropped. The role played earlier by the connected sets X and U (X) is now ful…lled by the convex sets L and V (L).
Theorem 2 Assumptions 1',2,3',4',5 hold. Then, the conclusions of the previous theorem follow.
Proof. Let v i and v be VNM utility functions for % i and % ext on L. By Lemma 3, these
where b i > 0 for all i. There are increasing functions f i on (Eu i ) (L), and f on
we rewrite the equation as:
after suitably relabelling the functions on the LHS. Now, L is a convex, hence connected set, and the weak topology ensures that it is path-connected. The functions w i and
are continuous on L, as are the composed functions g i w i = Eu i and f
Eu i ; hence, by Lemma 1, f 1 and the g i are continuous on their respective domains.
The last equation can be restated as
for all (z 1 ; :::
is a convex subset of full dimension, it has non-empty interior T = V (X) in R n . Furthermore, T is itself convex, hence connected in R n , so Lemma 2 can be applied to the functional equation as restricted to T .
The proof now parallels the previous one. It entails that v is a PAT of E P i u i , that, for i = 1; :::; n, v i is a PAT of Eu i , and that there are a i ; i = 1; :::; n and b s.t. % is represented by
on X. These facts entail the two claims on the sets of VNM functions made by the theorem.
Since the v i are a¢ nely independent by assumption, the Eu i also are, and the coef…cients a i are unique in the representation of % on L. Given the linearity of E, they are also unique in the representation of R on X.
As a last variant, we dispense with the assumption that either U (X) or V (L) is full-dimensional, but require that these two utility sets have the same a¢ ne dimension and realize their common dimension on the same subset of individuals. Formally, there is fj 1 ; :::; j k g f1; :::; ng such that dim u j 1 ; :::; u j k = dim U = dim fv j 1 ; :::; v j k g = dim V .
For k 2, we call the set fj 1 ; :::; j k g a common basis for U and V . Clearly, this algebraic assumption is neither weaker nor stronger than the preceding ones. It can be made part of either the …rst or the second set of assumptions. Speci…cally, take the …rst one, and replace Assumption 4 by:
Assumption 4". The image set U (X) has nonempty connected relative interior U (X) and is such that U (X) U (X) . Furthermore, there is a common basis B for U and V , where V is any vector of individual VNM representations on L.
Theorem 3 Assumptions 1,2,3,4",5 hold. Then, the conclusions of the initial theorem follow, except that the coe¢ cient a i may not be unique and even under Strong Pareto may be of any sign.
Proof. Assume w.l.g. that the common basis B consists of the …rst k individuals. Since the Pareto indi¤erence condition can be restated in terms of the individuals in B, Lemma 3 leads to
Utility functions of individuals outside B can be reexpressed as
ji u i + j ; j = k + 1; :::; n, and the equation in the proof of the initial theorem becomes
for suitably de…ned functions e u i , e f i .
This leads to a functional equation on e T = ( e u i (X)) i=1;:::;k that can be solved like the equation on T = (u i (X)) i=1;:::;n in the …rst proof. ( e T can be viewed as a full-dimensional subset of R k satisfying the conditions of Lemma 2, and the a¢ ne solution on e T can be extended by continuity to e T .) It follows that u is a PAT of
establishes the claim on the set of VNM utility functions for % ext on X. It also follows that, for i = 1; :::; k, u i is a PAT of u i .
We may now apply Lemma 3 to % and i , i = 1; :::; k, and conclude that there are coe¢ cients a 0 i ; i = 1; :::; k s.t.
is a VNM utility function for % on X. This can be rewritten as
for appropriate coe¢ cients that will not be unique if k < n. This establishes the claim on the set of VNM utility functions for %. To show that even with Strong Pareto a i may be nonpositive, take n = 3 and B = f1; 2g with u 1 = u 1 ; u 2 = u 2 ; u 3 = u 1 + u 2 and u 3 = 2u 1 + 2u 2 , with u 1 and u 2 being unrestricted. De…ne % on L from the representation E(u 1 + u 2 + u 3 ).
By construction, % satis…es Strong Pareto and has a VNM utility function u 0 = 2u 1 +2u 2 = u 3 on X. Now, if we put u 0 = a 1 u 1 + a 2 u 2 + a 3 u 3 , we see that the coe¢ cients a i can be chosen to be negative, e.g.,
Conclusion
The three theorems of the paper di¤er only by the technical assumptions they make, and their ethical import lies with the conclusion, obtained each time, that a social observer whose preferences on lotteries meet the conditions of the Aggregation Theorem must follow a weighted sum rule P i a i u i . That the coe¢ cients may be unequal or (in the last theorem)
nonpositive is a weakness from the perspective of classical utilitarians like Bentham.
However, weighted utilitarianism has some theoretical standing, and the measurement stage is anyhow the decisive one on the road to Benthamism. What matters most are the u i appearing in the formula.
By introducing a utilitarian observer at the outset, we make a salient addition to
Harsanyi, in a way that is fully consistent with Sen's point that utilitarianism has to be de…ned independently within the Harsanyi framework, or else the results will bear no connection with this doctrine. The exogenously given u i provide the desired basis of cardinal utility measurement. Thus, we take for granted that nonrisky alternatives are evaluated in the cardinal utilitarian way, the point of the theorems being to disseminate this evaluation to lotteries. Eventually, there will be a unique cardinalization for both items, which Harsanyi claimed without adducing any reason. If one accepts our conceptual addition of the utilitarian observer -as well as, of course, the added technical restrictions -Sen's point appears to be fully answered.
Perhaps less obviously, Weymark's point is also answered. Our assumptions about individual utility functions u i take them to be representations of ordinal VNM preferences, but the theorems invest them with a cardinal meaning, which is furthermore utilitarian in the sense just said. Brie ‡y put, non-a¢ ne ' i drop out from the social observer's criterion P i ' 1 i u i . As the proof goes, this follows because the utilitarian observer has evaluated lotteries by E P i u i , not by some more general E P i ' i u i , which in turn follows because the two conditions of the Aggregation Theorem have been applied to a utilitarian preference over lotteries that extends the utilitarian preference over sure outcomes.
From this summary, there remain only two ways of opposing the conclusion that the theorem confers ethical relevance to utilitarianism. One is to deny that a utilitarian preference over lotteries necessarily satis…es the stated conditions -the VNM one being more problematic than the Pareto principle. Not to mention Harsanyi himself, those economists, like Hammond (1996) and Mongin and d'Aspremont (1998) , who updated
Bentham's doctrine, do endorse the conditions. While we are not aware of utilitarian theories that would violate them, such theories can be conceived of. The other move is of course to deny that the conditions are appealing in and of themselves. It has been argued that the VNM conditions are questionable for a social observer (e.g., Diamond, 1967) , and that the Pareto principle is not compelling in a lottery context (e.g., Fleurbaey 2010). All these objections are in some sense secondary to the pivotal claim that the Aggregation Theorem has nothing to do with utilitarianism as an ethical doctrine. The aim of this paper was to debunk this claim.
